

Keynote Digital Authentication in the Real World without Sacrificing Privacy







Computing Conference 2020, 2020-07-16 16:30 (BST/UTC+1), London/virtual

Univ.-Prof. Dr. René Mayrhofer (JKU Linz) (Full disclosure: also affiliated with Android security, but not speaking for Google today)


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Digital Authentication – Identity and Attributes















Digital Authentication – Identity and Attributes














Digital Authentication – "State of the Art"














Digital Authentication – Identity on Smartphones













Scenario 1: Traffic Check







All attributes are transferred

- Name
- Date of birth
- Face picture in full resolution
- (optional) Place of residence
- (optional) Biometric features
- Vehicle classes, potential restrictions, ...


Also needs to work offline!



Scenario 2: Proof of Age







Only relevant attributes

- Face picture
- Age



Scenario 3: Public Transport



Location traces constitute highly sensitive data

- Place of residence / work
- Religious beliefs
- Illnesses
- Hobbies, particular preferences

Only relevant attributes

- Place of entry / exit or
- Possession of time based ticket

But no unique identifier!

Scenario 4: Contact Tracing



Location traces constitute highly sensitive data

- Place of residence / work
- Religious beliefs
- Illnesses
- Hobbies, particular preferences

Only relevant attributes

 Contact with (pseudonym) person X for Y minutes on day Z

But no unique identifier!



Requirements for Digital ID

Functional

- Real-world identification
- One-to-many
- Revocation

Security

- Key confidentiality
- Unforgeability
- Communication protection
- (future) State-of-the-art cryptography

Mobility

- Offline
- Power-off
- Scalability

Privacy

- Anonymity
- (forward/backward) Unlinkability
- User control
- Privacy-preserving attribute queries




Security and Privacy for draft mDL standard (ISO 18013-5)

- Security properties:
 - Anti-forgery: Identity Credential data is signed by the Issuing Authority
 - Anti-cloning: Secure Hardware produces MAC during provisioning using a key derived from a private key specific to the credential and an ephemeral public key from the reader.
 Public key corresponding to credential private key is signed by the Issuing Authority
 - Anti-eavesdropping: Communications between Reader/Verifier and Secure Hardware are encrypted and authenticated
- Privacy properties:
 - Data minimization: Reader/Verifier only receives data consented to by the holder.
 Backend infrastructure does not receive information about use
 - Unlinkability: Application may provision single-use keys
 - Auditability: Every transaction and its data is logged and available only to the Holder (not the application performing the transaction)



Question: Strictly require secure (certified) hardware?



The Android implementation






Image credit: Google




Digital Authentication – Identity on Smartphones














Digital Authentication – Vision






















Digital Authentication – Vision




Digital Authentication – Centralized Approach









Digital Authentication – Decentralized Approach



Digital Authentication – Decentralized Approach




Threats






Threats











Digital Authentication in the Physical World



Questions?



Web: https://jku.at/ins Email: rm@ins.jku.at Twitter: @rene_mobile

Wire: @rm



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